Specification of Simplified Policy Description Language (SPDL) ver 2.1.

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This document describes syntax and meaning of SPDL configuration elements.

1 Overview

Simplified policy is written in syntax called Simplified Policy Description Language (SPDL). SPDL compiler (seedit-converter) converts SPDL into normal SELinux policy language.

1.1 Feature

The feature of SPDL is hiding labels, and reducing number of permissions.

- Hiding labels
 SPDL does not use types to configure access control. You can use file name and port number to configure.
- Reduce number of permissions
 There are too many permissions in SELinux, so SPDL reduces number of permissions by removing permissions and integrating permissions. Permissions that does not have security impact is removed. Permission removal is implemented by allowing that permission to all domains. Integrating permission means, treating set of permissions as one permission. For example r permission for file integrates SELinux permissions related to file read. For detail of what kind of permissions are removed, integrated see Integrated/unsupported permissions in Simplified Policy in http://seedit.sourceforge.net/doc/permission_integrate/.

1.2 Overview of SPDL configuration elements

Configuration elements are following.

Giving domain to applications
 To assign domain, we have to configure domain transitions.

SPDL has two elements to configure domain transition: <code>domain_trans</code> and <code>program</code> . <code>domain_trans</code> is syntax to configure domain transition, <code>program</code> is syntax for simplified configuration.

- RBAC
 SPDL supports RBAC. role and user elements do that.
- Access control to file allow/deny are SPDL elements that enables to configure access control to normal files. allowdev exists for device files, and allowtmp exists for temporally(dynamically created) files.
- Access control to network allownet does this.

- Access control to IPC allowcom does access control to IPC and signal.
- Access control to other privilege
 Other important OS operations that is not restricted above can be configured by *allowpriv*.

1.3 Default deny rule

Domain and roles are denied all permissions unless allowed by SPDL.

1.4 Terms

• Domain

Domain is the same as domain in SELinux. It is attached to process by domain transition.

• Role

Role in SPDL is simplified. Role is identified with a domain for user shell. In SPDL, we describe access rights for role. In fact, it is giving access rights for user shell of the role. For example, when you give access right for $sysadm_r$, access right is given to $sysadm_t$ (Domain for user shell of $sysadm_r$).

Note that in generated SELinux policy, all roles can type every types. There is no syntax corresponding to *role:x:types:y* in simplified language.

• Unconfined domain

unconfined domain is a domain that is configured to be allowed everything. If process is given unconfined domain, it is passes all SELinux permission checks, so it runs the same as in normal Linux.

To configure unconfined domain allowpriv all; is used.

2 Structure of configuration by simplified language

Configuration is composed of sections. In each section, access control for domains/roles are described. Section begins with { and ends with }.

2.1 Syntax of section

{ (begin of section)

domain/role (declare domain or role, one domain or role can be declared in one section)

users (This can be used only for role)

domain_trans—program (Configure domain transition)

allow/deny—allowxx (Describe access control for files, access control for resources other than file) } (end of section)

3 Import configuration from other file:include

you can include configuration from other file by include statement. Syntax is following.

include *filename*; The include path can be specified by -I option of seedit-converter, by default it is /etc/seedit/policy/include.

4 Declare domain and role

4.1 Declare domain:domain

1. Syntax

domain domain name;

2. Meaning

Declare domain. All configuration in a section is done for the declared domain.

3 Constraints

Domain name must end with $_t$. This statement can not be used twice in one section.

4.2 Declare role:role

1. Syntax

role role name;

2. Meaning

Declare role. $role\ name\$ is associated to user by using user statement as shown below.

3. Constraints

 $role\ name\ must\ end\ with\ _r.$ This statement can not be used twice in one section.

5 Configure RBAC:user

1. Syntax

user user name;

2. Meaning

Define users who can use the role.

```
3. Example {
  role user_r;
  user root;
  user ynakam;
```

Above means user root and ynakam can use user_r.

4. Constraints

It can be used only section where role is declared.

6 Domain transition

6.1 Domain transition:domain_trans

1. Syntax domain_trans parent domain filename-of-entrypoint;

2. Meaning

This defines how domain is assigned to process.

3. Example

```
{
  domain httpd_t;
  domain_trans initrc_t /sbin/httpd;
```

Above means that when process(domain: initrc_t) executes /sbin/httpd, /sbin/httpd runs as httpd_t domain.

4. Note

Dynamic domain transition can be configured by omitting entry point. For example, { domain httpd_t; domain_trans initrc_t;

means, dynamic domain transition from initrc_t to httpd_t is allowed.

6.2 Simplified domain transition:program

1. Syntax program path-to-program;

2. Meaning

By this, path-to-program is attached domain when launched from command line, and /etc/init.d scripts. That is to say, allow domain transition from unconfined domain. However, domain transition from authentication program domain(such as domains for su,login,sshd) is not configured. Which domains are regarded as authentication_domain is configured in authentication_domain field in converter.conf.

3. Example

```
1)
{
domain httpd_t;
program /usr/sbin/httpd;
}
```

/usr/sbin/httpd is attached httpd_t domain when launched from command line and /etc/init.d script.

4. Note

This element is intended to be used in relaxed policy. This will not mean nothing in more strict policy where there is not unconfined domain.

7 Access control to normal files:allow/deny

7.1 allow

- 1. Syntax
 - (a) allow $filename \mid label [r], [w], [x], [s], [o], [t], [a], [c], [e], [dx];$
- 2. Meaning
 - (a) Allow access to file.
- 3. Specifying filename
 - Wildcard

For filename directory/* and directory** can be used. For example, /var/* means, all files in /var directory, and /var directory. /var/** means, all files under /var, /var directory and files/dirs in its child,child's child... directories.

• Home directories

File name that starts with ~ represents home directory (Not including /root). For example, /public_html means, /home/all users/public_html. But in role configuration, it is different, it means home directories for users that can use role.

- 4. Meaning of permissions.
 - r(Read)
 Allows to read file
 - w(Write)

Allows to write, create, delete file. Note that creation of device is not allowed unless *allowpriv devcreate* is described.

- x(eXecute)
 Allows to execute file.
- s(Search)
 Search file tree. i.e. Get contents of directory. For file, means nothing.
- 5. Example {
 domain httpd_t;
 ...
 allow /var/www/** r,s;

httpd_t is allowed to read all files and directories under /var/www and its children.

6. Detailed configuration support

In addition to s,r,x,w permissions, permissions o,t,a,c,e can be used. Permission w is divided into those permissions.

- o: Overwrite
 Allows only writing file, not allow create, delete.
- t: seTattr
 Allow modify attribute of file.
- a: Append Allow append to file.
- c: Create Allow to create file.
- e: Erase Allow to delete file
- 7. Domain execute permission

dx permission means Domain Execute. If domain is defined for the program, program is executed in new domain.

```
Example:
      {
      domain httpd_t;
          program /usr/sbin/httpd;
```

```
allow /var/www/cgi-bin/test.cgi r,s,dx;
}
{
domain cgi_t;
    program /var/www/cgi-bin/test.cgi;
    allow .........
}
```

In this case, httpd_t domain have dx permission to test.cgi. Domain is defined below. So, test.cgi runs as different domain.

8. Limitation about home-directories

Deny statement for individual home directory does not work. For example,

```
deny /home/ynakam/public_html;
```

does not work.

7.2 deny

- 1. Syntax deny *filename*;
- 2. Meaning
 This is used to describe constraints for allow and, also used to cancel allow.
- 3. Example
 - (a) Example 1: Describe constraints

```
*In file constraints
deny /etc/shadow;

*In httpd_t.a
{
    domain httpd_t;
    include constraints;
    allow /etc/* r,s;
}

By include constraints; configuration in file constrains is included .
So, the above configuration is the same as following.
{
    domain httpd_t;
    include constraints;
    deny /etc/shadow;
```

```
allow /etc/* r,s;
}
```

This means, httpd_t have r,s permission to files in /etc. But can not access /etc/shadow. To allow access to /etc/shadow, allow /etc/shadow r,s; should be described explicitly. Deny is useful to prevent misconfiguration.

(b) Example 2: Cancel allow

```
{
   domain httpd_t;
   allow /etc/* r,s;
   deny /etc;
   allow /etc/* r,s; is cancelled by deny /etc;
```

7.3 Priority of allow, deny when conflict happens

- 1. OR operation(When allow conflicts)
 When allow rule conflicts, OR operation is applied.
 - Example

```
domain foo_t;
allow /var/** r;
allow /var/** s;

foo_t have r,s permission to under /var.
domain foo_t;
allow /var/run/* r;
allow /var/run/** w;
```

foo_t have r permission to in /var. But for sub-directory(/var/run/xxx etc), it has w permission.

• Conflict between child and parent

```
domain foo_t;
allow /var/** r;
allow /var/run/** w;
```

foo_t have r permission to under /var (including subdir). For /var/run , it has only w permission.

- 2. Cancel previous configuration (When allow/deny conflicts)
 When allow and deny conflicts, configuration that appears later survives.
 - Example

```
domain foo_t;
 allow /foo/* r,s;
 deny /foo/*;
  allow foo/*r,s is cancelled.
 domain foo_t;
 deny /foo/*;
 allow /foo/* r,s;
  deny /foo/* is cancelled.
 domain foo_t;
 allow /foo/bar/** r,s;
         /foo/**;
 deny
  allow /foo/bar/**r,s is cancelled.
• Exception
 However,
 domain foo_t;
 deny /foo/bar/**;
 allow /foo/** r,s;
  deny /foo/bar/** is not cancelled. To cancel deny, you have to de-
 scribe allow for denied directory (in this case, allow /foo/bar some_permission;)
```

7.4 Special files

Access to following files are special.

- 1. /dev/tty* /dev/pts /dev/ptmx, /dev/vcs*,/dev/vcsa*

 If you write allow for those file, this does nothing. Access control to these files must be done by allowdev.
- 2. /proc, /sysfs, /selinux, /dev/tmpfs
 Allow to these files do nothing, because these files are mounted on filesystems that do not support xattr. See allowfs. For /selinux see allowpriv getsecurity.

7.5 Notice about links

7.5.1 Treatment of symbolic links

Configuration to file that contains symbolic link is ignored. For example, allow /etc/init.d/httpd r; is ignored(init.d is symbolic link to rc.d/init.d).

7.5.2 Treatment of hard links

In Linux system, contents of file can be referred by multiple name using hard link. Hardlink is rarely used recent distro, but you have to note about this if you want to preserve security.

In SPDL, following rule exists about hard link.

If file has multiple hardlink, to access the file, you must specify originally existing file name.

For example, /etc/shadow and /var/chroot/etc/shadow is hardlinked, and /etc/shadow exists originally, to access contents of /etc/shadow, you have to use file name /etc/shadow. Configuration using /var/chroot/etc/shadow will be igonored. If some domain(assume foo_t) want to read /var/chroot/etc/shadow, you have to configure allow /etc/shadow r;

Next, there is a question, what is criteria of file *originally* exist? Following is answer.

In following, /etc/shadow and /var/shadow is assumed as hardlinked files.

- 1. If rule is described to one file, the file is treated as original. Ex: allow /etc/shadow r; is described in some domain, but rules using filename /var/shadow is not described, /etc/shadow is treated as original.
- 2. If rules are described to multiple hardlinked files, the filename that name is the youngest is treated as original

 Ex: allow /etc/shadow r, and allow /var/shadow r; are described in some domains, /var/shadow is treated as original, because /var/shadow ¿/etc/shadow.
- If rules are not described for hardlinked files, the directory names that hardlinks exist are compared. The file whose directory name is oldest is original.

Ex: /etc/shadow, /var/shadow do not appear in any domain. Then /var/shadow is treated as original. Because /var ¿ /etc.

If you are not sure which hardlinke is *original*, you can use all names. It means, you can describe

```
allow /etc/shadow r;
allow /var/shadow r;
```

1 of 2 will be igored, and do no harm.

Above treatment of hardlink is necessary to avoid a kind of back door of path name based configuration. Assume hard link to /etc/shadow is created by some trick under /var/www/html, without this behavior, apache web server can access contents of /etc/shadow via /var/www/html/shadow. To protect this, we must limit way to access hard link to 1.

http://securityblog.org/brindle/2006/04/19 is good reference.

8 Access control to devices: allowdev

8.1 allowdev(1)

Device files must be handled carefully. Because device files are interface to kernel. When device file is linked to driver that handles critical information, read/write to such device will lead to leak of confidential information or break of system. Following allowdev statements restricts access to device files.

1. syntax

(a) allowdev -root directory;

2. meaning

By default, when *allow* statement is described to file, access to device files are not allowed. The directory that contains devices must be described in advance, by allowdev -root.

3. Example

```
{
domain httpd_t;
allow /dev/* r,w;
```

In above, httpd_t can access normal files under /dev, but can not access device files.

```
{
domain httpd_t;
allowdev -root /dev;
allow /dev/* r,w;
```

In above, httpd_t can access both normal files and devices under /dev. However, in permission w, creation and remove devices are not granted unless allowpriv devcreate is described.

8.2 allowdev(2)

tty devices are device files /dev/tty*, pts devices are devices under /dev/pts. tty devices represents local login terminal, and pts devices represents terminal in X and ssh terminal. These devices are linked to terminal when user logs in, or open X/ssh terminal. If you can write other users terminal device files, you can write message to his terminal. In SELinux environment, tty/pts device files are given label according to login user's role. So tty/pts device files should be treated differently in SPDL.

1. syntax

- (a) allowdev -pts—-tty—-allterm open;
- (b) allowdev -pts—-tty—-allterm role [r],[w];
- (c) allowdev -pts—-tty—-allterm role admin;

2. meaning

-tty means, tty devices. -pts means, pts devices. -allterms means both tty and pts devices.

- (a) This is usually used in role section. Allow role to have its own tty/pts device. At the time of login, by login program, role's tty device file is given type role prefix_tty_device_t.
- (b) Allow to read/write role's tty device.
- (c) Allow to change label of tty device, and rename, unlink.

3. Special role

• general this means tty/pts before labeled(The type is devtty_t and tty_device_t, devpts_t, ptmx_t). Usually, access to these are harmless except admin permission.

- all All other roles tty/pts
- vcs
 This can be used only in allowdev -tty. Means vcs file(/dev/vcs*, /dev/vcsa*), these provide access to screen-shot of tty terminal.

9 Access control to files on misc file systems: allowfs

SELinux can do fine-grained access control to files on filesystems that support extended-attributes, such as ext3, ext2 and xfs. For such files, you configure access control using *allow* statement. In other filesystems, you should configure *allowfs* described in this section.

• Syntax

- 1. allowfs name_of_filesystem [s],[r],[x],[w]; For name_of_filesystem tmpfs sysfs autofs usbfs cdfs romfs ramfs dosfs smbfs nfs proc proc_kmsg proc_kcore xattrfs can be used.
- Meaning

1. Allow access to files in specified system. For example, allowfs proc s,r; means to grant s,r access to files on proc filesystem(/proc). When you see logs whose types are filesystem_t, you may have to use allowfs. This means, if you find log about read access to sysfs_t is denied, you may add allowfs sysfs s,r;.

• Notice about name_of_filesystem

- proc filesystem

Access control to proc file system is a little fine-grained. proc_kmsg means, /proc/kmsg, proc_kcore means /proc/kcore. proc_pid_self means process information of own process in /proc/pid/. proc_pid_other means process information for all others. proc means other files on /proc.

- xattrfs

This means filesystem that supports extended-attribute, but not configured to use SELinux's label. For example, if you format USB memory as ext3 on non-SELinux machine. Next you mount the USB memory in SELinux machine, the files on it are recognized as xattrfs. You have to use *allowfs xattrfs permissions* in such case.

- cdfs
- This corresponds to iso 9660 and udf filesystem.
- dosfs
 - This corresponds to fat, vfat, ntfs.
- smbfs

This corresponds to cifs and smbfs.

10 Access control to temporally file:allowtmp

10.1 Why allowtmp is necessary?

allowtmp is prepared to configure access control to temporally files. Before going detail, let's see why such configuration element is necessary. SELinux identifies files based on inode, not file name. File name based configuration does not work correctly when inode number changes or inode does not exist at the time of configuration(typically such files are temporally files). Such files exist under /var/run, /tmp, /var/tmp. For example, assume following configuration exists.

```
domain httpd_t
allow /var/run r,s;
allow /var/run/httpd.pid r,w,s;
```

At first, httpd_t have r,w,s permission to /var/run/httpd.pid. However, when httpd is restarted /var/run/httpd.pid is removed and created again. In this process, inode number is changed. When inode number changes, it inherits parent

directory's permission. i.e: httpd_t have r,s permission to /var/run/httpd.pid(the permission of /var/run). So to grant r,w,s permission to /var/run/httpd.pid, r,w,s permission should be given to parent directory(/var/run). However, in this configuration, httpd_t can r,w,s other daemons pid files under /var/run. In second example, when program creates files randomly under /tmp it is a problem. Assume program A(domain is a_t) and program B(domain is b_t) creates files whose names are random under /tmp. In such case,following configuration will be described.

```
{
domain a_t;
allow /tmp/** r,w;
}
{
domain b_t;
allow /tmp/** r,w;
}
```

This means, program A can access program B's temporally files, and program B can access program A's temporally files.

In above example, access control configuration can not be described for individual files, but for directory what such files belongs. If you think it is enough, following will not necessary:-).

10.2 What is allowtmp?

To resolve this problem, SELinux has a feature called file type transition. *allowtmp* is a feature to configure file type transition. In file type transition, when domain creates files under some directory, created file is given a label. The label can be named by policy. Following is example usage of *allowtmp*.

```
domain httpd_t;
allow /var/run r,s;
allowtmp -dir /var/run -name httpd_var_run_t; -(a)
allow httpd_var_run_t r,w,s; -(b)
```

In (a), when httpd_t create file under /var/run, it is labeled as httpd_var_run_t. And in (b), httpd_t can r,w,s access to the created file. To identify file using label name(httpd_var_run_t).

10.3 Syntax and meaning

- 1. Syntax
 - (a) allowtmp -dir directory -name label permission;
 - (b) allowtmp -fs file system name -name label permission; permission is the same as file permission and can be omitted.

2. Meaning

- (a) When domain create file under *directory* it is labeled as *label* and have permission to the created file specified by *permission*. *permission* can be omitted. When omitted, permission can be given by *allow*.
- (b) This is used to configure allowtmp under files that do not support extended attribute, currently, this can be used only for tmpfs.
- (c) About label
 - When label is auto, label is named automatically based on domain and directory. For example, domain is hoge_t, and directory is /var/, label name is hoge_var_t.
 - When *label* is *all* or *, it means all files under *directory* created using allowtmp.

3. Example

```
domain httpd_t ;
allowtmp -dir /var/run -name auto r,w;
```

Files created under /var/run by httpd_t is labeled as httpd_var_run_t and httpd_t can r,w,s access to such files.

```
domain httpd_t
allowtmp -dir /var/run -name auto r,w;
domain named_t
allowtmp -dir /var/run -name auto r,w;
domain initrc_t;
allowtmp -dir /var/run -name all r,w;
```

Files created under /var/run by httpd_t is labeled as httpd_var_run_t and httpd_t can r,w access to such files(named_t can not access). Files created under /var/run by named_t is labeled as named_var_run_t and named_t can r,w access to such files(httpd_t can not access) initrc_t can r,w access to above files because -name all is specified. -name all is used to administrate files created by allowtmp.

11 Access control to network: allownet

allownet statements is prepared to configure network access control. It can configure access control to port , netif(Network Interface), node(IP address) and inheritance of socket.

11.1 Port usage

1. Syntax

allownet -protocol protocol -port port number permission; protocol: tcp,udp can be specified, splitted by ,. port number: number and -1023 and 1024- , and * can be described, splitted by ,. permission: client or server splitted by , can be described

2. Meaning

Allow permissions to be TCP/UDP server/client using port. Port number -1023 means, all unused ports under 1023. 1024- means all unused ports after 1024. * means all ports.

3. Note about udp server

If you describe allownet -protocol udp -port xxx server; The domain also behave as client to port number over 1024.

4. Example

```
domain httpd_t;
# httpd_t can be server using port 80 and 443.
allownet -protocol tcp -port 80,443 server;
# httpd_t can use TCP/UDP 3306 service(MySQL) as client.
allownet -protocol tcp,udp 3306 client;
```

11.2 Usage of RAW socket

Usage of RAW socket must be restricted, because RAW socket can be used for IP spoofing and eavesdropping.

1. Syntax

```
allownet -protocol raw use; permission: client or server or * splitted by , can be described.
```

2. Meaning

The domain is allowed to use RAW socket.

11.3 Usage of Network Interface(netif) and IP address(node)

Usage of netif/node is allowed by this. In default policy, it is allowed to all domains.

1. Syntax

(a) allownet -protocol protocol -netif name of NIC permission; protocol: tcp,udp,raw and * can be specified, splitted by ,. name of NIC: NIC name(such as lo,eth0,eth1) splitted by ,. permission: send or recv splitted by , can be described.

(b) allownet -protocol protocol -node address permission; protocol: tcp,udp,raw and * can be specified, splitted by ,. address: ipv4address/netmask or * splitted by ,. Example: 192.168.0.1/255.255.255.0 . And * means all address. permission: send or recv splitted by , can be described.

2. Meaning

- (a) Allows to send or receive packet to/from NIC.
- (b) Allows to send or receive packet to/from IP address.
- 3. Example

```
{
domain httpd_t;
allownet -protocol tcp use;
allownet -protocol tcp -port 80 server;
allownet -netif eth0 send,recv;
}
--> httpd_t can use tcp socket and be server using TCP 80 port.
And can send/recv packet to/from eth0.
```

11.4 Inherit socket from other domain

Following syntax allows using socket of other domain. It is rare to configure.

- 1. Syntax
 - (a) allownet -protocol *protocol* -domain *domain* use; *protocol*, tcp,udp can be specified, splitted by ,.
- 2. Meaning
 - (a) This enables to restrict inheriting socket from other domain. This configures from where the domain can inherit socket. When *domain* is *self*, the domain can use socket which is created by its own domain.
- 3. Example

```
domain foo_t;
# foo_t can inherit UDP socket from bar_t
allownet -protocol udp -domain bar_t;
```

12 Access control of process communication: allowcom

12.1 allowcom (IPC)

- 1. Syntax allowcom -ipc|-unix|-sem|-msg|-msgq|-shm|-pipe to domain [r],[w];
- 2. Meaning

Allow to communicate with to domain by specified IPC. If to domain is self, this means IPC within domain. If to domain is * the domain can IPC to every domain. -ipc is allowing all kinds of IPCs, it is simplified configuration. If you want to specify specific kind of ipc, you can use following. -unix is unix domain socket, -sem is semaphore, -msg is message, -msgq is message queue, -shm is shared memory, -pipe is pipe.

12.2 allowcom(Signal)

- 1. Syntax allowcom -sig to domain [c],[k],[s],[n],[o];
- 2. Meaning
 Allow to send signal to to domain. [c] is sigchld, [k] is sigkill, [s] is sigstop,
 [n] is signull, [o] is other signals.

13 Access control other administrative access rights:allowpriv

- Syntax allowpriv *string*; *string* is name of privilege. It is described in next section.
- Meaning Allow access rights represented by string.

Next, what can be configured for *string* can be categorized into following.

- POSIX capability
- Related to kernel
- Related to SELinux operations
- Others

13.1 allowpriv: POSIX capability

Strings that begin with cap_{\bullet} is POSIX capability. You can see detailed meaning by man capabilities.

13.1.1 Capabilities that can not be configured

Following POSIX capabilities can not be configured, because it can be configured in different place.

• CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE

This restricts usage of wellknown ports, but by allownet, you can configure better. So this is omitted.

• CAP_MKNOD

This is allowed in allowpriv devcreate.

• CAP_AUDIT_WRITE

Operations that is restricted by this is the same as allowpriv audit_write, so this is omitted.

• CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL

Operations that is restricted by this is the same as allowpriv audit_control, so this is omitted.

13.1.2 Configurable capabilities

• cap_sys_pacct

Configures kernel accounting (see acct(2)).

• cap_sys_module

Allows to install kernel module.

• cap_net_admin

Allow capability $\it CAP_NET_ADMIN(Such as administrate NIC, route table).$

• cap_sys_boot

Allow capability *CAP_SYS_BOOT*. This means allow the usage of reboot system call.

• cap_sys_rawio

Allow capability CAP_SYS_RAWIO . This means usage of ioperm, iopl system call and access to /dev/mem.

• cap_sys_chroot

Allow to use chroot.

• cap_sys_nice

Allow capability *CAP_SYS_NICE*. This means process scheduling.

- \bullet cap_sys_resource Allow capability $CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.$ This means usage of rlimit etc.
- \bullet cap_sys_time Allow capability $CAP_SYS_TIME.$ Thie means modify system clock.
- cap_sys_admin
 The same as POSIX capability *CAP_SYS_ADMIN*. This permissions overlaps other permissions, so if you allow this, not so serious problem. By denying this, it can restrict sethostname and some ioctl operations.
- cap_sys_tty_config

 The same as capability *CAP_TTY_CONFIG*. Change keyboard configuration, and usage of vhangup call.
- cap_ipc_lock Allow capability *CAP_IPC_LOCK*. This means to lock memory.
- cap_dac_override
- cap_dac_read_search
- cap_setuid
- \bullet cap_setgid
- cap_chown
- cap_setpcap
- cap_fowner
- cap_fsetid
- \bullet cap_linux_immutable
- cap_sys_ptrace
- cap_lease
- cap_ipc_owner

• cap_kill

13.2 allowpriv: related to kernel

Configures privileges to communicate and administrate kernel. Following strings can be used.

1. netlink

Allows to communicate with kernel by netlink socket.

2. klog_read

Allows to read kernel messages by syslog(2) call. Usually it is required to use dmesg command.

3. klog_adm

Allows to change configuration of kernel message output.

4. audit_read

Allows to read status and configuration of kernel audit subsystem.

5. audit_write

Allows to send log message to audit subsystem in kernel.

6. audit_adm

Change configuration of kernel audit subsystem.

13.3 allowpriv: related to SELinux operations

Allow privileges to administrate SELinux.

1. relabel

Allow to relabel all files. You must also allow getsecurity and allowpriv search.

2. part_relabel

Allow to relabel files that the domain can write. You must also allow getsecurity.

3. setfscreate

This is necessary only applications that use SELinux API(setfscreatecon).

4. getsecurity

Allow to get security policy decisions, by accessing /selinux.

5. setenforce

Allow to toggle enforcing/permissive mode.

6. load_policy

Allow to load policy to kernel.

7. setsecparam

Change performance parameter of SELinux via /selinux/avc

8. getsecattr

Get security information(such as domain, stored in /proc/pid/attr) of other processes.

13.4 allowpriv: other privileges

Allow other privileges.

1. quotaon

Allow to quotaon.

2. mount

Allow to mount device.

3. unlabel

Allow full access to unlabeled files(Files labeled as unlabeled_t).

4. devcreate

Allow to create device files in directory that the domain can write. Without this, a process can not create device file on a directory even it is configured writable.

5. setattr

Allow to setattr to files that the domain can's access. Without this setattr permission is granted in w permission.

6. search

Allow s permission to all files.

7. read

Allow r permission to all files.

8. write

Allow w permission to all files.

9. all

13.5 denypriv

This can be used to cancel allowpriv configuration.

14 Access control of kernel key retention service:allowkey

This feature is included at version 2.1 or later.

After Linux 2.6.18, new feature kernel key retention service) is included. By the feature, each process can obtain key. For detail of key retention service, please refer to kernel document Document/keys.txt (You can look at the copy at http://free-electrons.com/kerneldoc/latest/keys.txt). allowkey controls access to key. This feature is effective only for FC5 or later. Cent OS does not have kernel key subsystem, so allowkey means nothing.

1. Syntax

allowkey domain permissions;

For permissions, you can use following.

v: View. Look attribute of key.

r: Read. Read contents of key.

W: Write. Write contents of key.

s: Search. Search keyrings.

l: Link. Permits key or keyrings to be linked to.

t: Set Attribute: Set attribute of key.

For detail of permission, see Document/keys.txt.

2. Meaning

Allow access to keys retained by domain.

For example,

allowkey login_t v,r;

means, allow view and read access to keys, obtained by process whose domain is login_t.